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Abstract
An important contribution in sociophysics is the Galam’s model of rumors spreading. This model provides
an explanation of rumors spreading in a population and explains some interesting social phenomena such
as the diffusion of hoaxes. In this paper the model has been reformulated as a Markov process highlighting
the stochastic nature of the phenomena. This formalization allows us to derive conditions for consensus to
be reached and for the existence of some interesting phenomena such as the emergence of impasses. The
proposed formulation allows a deeper and more comprehensive analysis of the diffusion of rumors.
Keywords: Sociophysics, Binary games, Hypergeometric random variable, Stochastic matrix, Absorbing
Markov Chain.
1. Introduction
Consensus in groups has attracted interest from different disciplines, namely social psychology, economics,
sociology and political sciences. For example, the influence of social pressure exercised by a minority is studied
in [17] where the Authors analyze how behavioral style may be a general source of influence. The process by
which a group reaches consensus has been formalized and mathematically analyzed in [9] and [3] providing
also simple conditions determining whether it is possible for the group to reach consensus. Another important
contribution is provided by [16] which introduces a time-changing influential matrix and provides a sufficient
condition to obtain convergence on the influential weights. More recent contributions based on the same
modeling framework account for strategic interaction and study the existence of possible consensus equilibria
when strategic interaction and social influence are combined together. For example, [7] incorporates in a
DeGroot-like model, see again [9], the possibility that agents misrepresent their opinion with the intent of
reaching a conformity. Indeed, adopting a behavior that is different from the others might cause disutility.
In this case, the combination of this strategic acting and the social influence requires additional conditions
to reach consensus. Following a similar idea, [8] introduces an extension of the classical DeGroot model of
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opinion formation for studying the transmission of cultural traits in an overlapping generation setting, where
parents strategically display a cultural trait to influence their children.
Sociophysics as well, has devoted a lot of attention to social influence, starting from the pioneering
works by Galam (see, e.g., [14]) to recent contributions, such as [18]; for a review see [13] and [20]. In his
contributions [11] and [12], Galam moves the perspective from within the group to a whole population whose
individuals try to choose an opinion (true or false) on a rumor on the basis of repeated discussions in social
gatherings. At each of them, a small group of people get together and line up with a consensual opinion in
which everyone agrees with the majority inside the group. His model provides a plausible explanation for
the diffusion or self-propagation of rumors through free public debates, such as the temporary diffusion of
the so called Pentagon French hoax, according to which no plane crashed on the Pentagon on September
the 11th. Indeed, although initially supported only by a minority of the population, this rumor started to
propagate with an astonishing and unexpected adhesion till the moment in which a strong media campaign
carried out by newspapers reversed the process.
In the Galam’s formulation of the model the binomial distribution has been used to approximate the
probability of having a specific table seating configuration. The use of the binomial distribution is a good
modeling approximation as long as populations with a large number of agents and small size discussion
group are considered. Nevertheless, this approach may create distortions in the prediction of the dynamics
of rumors in small communities. In order to deal with this problem, we formalize the process as an absorbing
Markov chain, in which the states of the process correspond to the number of agents holding one opinion.
Our approach extends Galam’s analysis providing further results and precision. The goal is to have further
information about the process of diffusion of opinions which are not possible to obtain using the original
Galam’s formulation. In particular, we aim to investigate thoroughly the evolution of the rumors spreading
process identifying all the absorbing states and computing the probability to reach each of them.
The structure of the paper is the following: In Section 2 the model is described as an absorbing Markov
chain. In Section 3 the stochastic killing point is defined. This is the stochastic version of the killing point
introduced in [12]. In Section 4 the formula for the conditional expected values is provided. Finally, in
Section 5 further possible developments of the model are suggested.
2. Formalization of the process
Consider a N person finite population and assume that only two opinions, ‘+’ and ‘−’, are possible.
Assume that at time t = 0, 1, . . . each individual holds either one or the other opinion and Y t denotes the
number of those holding opinion ‘+’ at time t. The set of possible states of the population with respect to
opinion ‘+’ is therefore S = {0, 1, . . . , N}, where state 0 means consensus has been reached on opinion ‘−’
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while, on the contrary, state N means consensus has been reached on opinion ‘+’. Not all the states in S
are necessarily feasible. State feasibility depends on aspects, which will be introduced later, such as social
space and discussion functions .
As in [12], [5] and [6] the interaction takes place at different size tables. The social space, where the
discussion takes place, is the set of tables N = {T1, T2, . . . , TL} with1 L < N . Let |Tr| be the size of table
Tr with
∑
Tr∈N
|Tr| = N . The table sizes, i.e., the number of people that can be seated at a given table, can
be summarized in vector n = (|T1| , |T2| , . . . , |TL|) ∈ RL. As the number of seats at each table is the only
relevant variable, the social space can be denoted either by N or n; furthermore we assume as in [12] that
the social space remains the same during the whole process.
Given a social space N , we can determine how may tables have size k as follows
τk =
∑
Tr∈N
δk,|Tr | (1)
where δk,|Tr | is the Kronecker’s delta.
As we assume the social space being fixed over time, the probability ak to be seated at a size k table is
stationary and can be determined as follows
ak =
k
N
τk with k = 1, . . . ,K, (2)
where K is the number of seats of the largest size table in the social space. Given the social space N =
{T1, T2, . . . , TL}, vector y = (y1, y2, . . . , yL) indicates a generic seating configuration where y1 agents with
opinion ‘+’ are seated at table T1, y2 are seated at table T2,. . . and yL are seated at table TL, with the
obvious feasibility conditions 0 ≤ yr ≤ |Tr|, r = 1, 2, . . . , L. Therefore entries in y depend2 on the social
space.
Assuming y ∈ S agents with opinion ‘+’, let us introduce the set Ωy as
Ωy =
{
y : 0 ≤ yr ≤ min (|Tr| , y) , r = 1, 2, . . . , L and
L∑
r=1
yr = y
}
.
This set consists of all possible seating configurations of y agents with opinion ‘+’ given the social space.
The probability of each seating configuration y ∈ Ωy, ∀y ∈ S can be computed as follows
Proposition 1. Assuming all seating configurations are equiprobable, then the probability of configuration
1The case L = N , i.e. all table of dimension 1, is trivial and therefore will not be considered.
2For the sake of simplicity we can avoid using the heavier notation yn as the social space is assume fixed.
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y ∈ Ωy, ∀y ∈ S is
Py (y) =
(
y
y1,y2,...,yL
)(
N−y
|T1|−y1,|T2|−y2,...,|TL|−yL
)(
N
|T1|,|T2|,...,|TL|
) = (|T1|y1 ) · · · (|TL|yL )(
N
y
) , (3)
where
(
b
b1,b2,...,bL
)
is a multinomial coefficient. Py (y) : Ωy → [0, 1] is a probability mass function.
Proof. Given a N -agents population and a social space n = (|T1| , |T2| , . . . , |TL|). The number of all the
possible combinations of the N agents at the L tables of social space is
(
N
|T1|,|T2|,...,|TL|
)
and the number of
possible combinations of y agents with opinion ‘+’ and N − y agents with opinion ‘−’ for which we have the
seating configuration y =(y1, y2, . . . , yL) is(
y
y1, y2, . . . , yL
)(
N − y
|T1| − y1, |T2| − y2, . . . , |TL| − yL
)
.
Since all the
(
N
|T1|,|T2|,...,|TL|
)
possible combinations are equiprobable, the probability of the seating configu-
ration y is given by
Py (y) =
(
y
y1,y2,...,yL
)(
N−y
|T1|−y1,|T2|−y2,...,|TL|−yL
)(
N
|T1|,|T2|,...,|TL|
) .
By multinomial coefficients properties and Chu-Vandermonde’s identity, it is clear that Py (y) : Ωy → [0, 1]
is a probability mass function.
As in [12] the dynamics of the system evolves at discrete times, t ∈ N. At each iteration, agents are
randomly seated at the tables. At the different tables, individuals line up with a consensual opinion in which
everyone agrees with the majority inside the group and afterwards they leave the tables. As in [12], when an
opinion is exactly split at an even size table the outcome is determined assuming a bias in favor of opinion
‘−’. A single step of the opinion dynamics is illustrated in the example provided in Figure 1.
Empty social spaces Social gathering
before discussion
Social gathering
after discussion
Empty social spaces
Figure 1: A one step opinion dynamics. First stage, people sharing the two opinions are moving around. Grey have opinion ‘+’
while black have opinion ‘−’. No discussion is occurring with 2 gray and 2 black. Second stage right, people are partitioned in
groups of various sizes from one to three and no change of opinion occurs. Third stage, within each group consensus has been
reached. As a result, they are now 1 gray and 3 black. Last stage, people are again moving around with no discussion.
The described mechanism of diffusion of rumors can be formalized as a memoryless stochastic process
(Y t)t≥0 where Y
t is a random variable representing the number of agents with opinion ‘+’ at time t. To
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this purpose we formalize the change of opinion among agents seated at table Tr by introducing the majority
rule discussion function D:
D (yr, |Tr|) =

|Tr| if yr ≥
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
+ 1
0 if yr ≤
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋ , (4)
where ⌊·⌋ gives the greatest integer less than or equal to the argument.
The step function D describes the biased discussion rule as in [12]. Different opinion formation rules
within groups can be modeled with appropriate discussion functions. For example, when the discussion is
not biased it is sufficient to consider:
D′ (yr, |Tr|) =

|Tr| if yr > |Tr| /2
nr/2 if yr = |Tr| /2
0 if yr < |Tr| /2
. (5)
In the following, consistently to [12], we will consider only discussion function (4).
The social space and the majority rule discussion function determine the set of feasible states Fn ⊆ S.
According to function D, at each table Tr the discussion ends with either |Tr| or 0 agents with opinion ‘+’.
It follows that state s is feasible if and only if there exists at least a table combination Cs ⊆ N such that
s =
∑
Tr∈Cs
|Tr|. Generally, there are more than one table combination giving state s.
The next step to formalize the stochastic process is to define the transition probability from one state
to another in the state space Fn under majority rule discussion functions. Consider the set ωi,j ⊆ Ωi of
seating configurations such that, starting with i agents with opinion ‘+’, after the discussion j agents end
up with opinion ‘+’ (under majority rule discussion function); formally
ωi,j =
{
y : y ∈ Ωi and
L∑
r=1
D (yr, |Tr|) = j
}
. (6)
Therefore, starting with i agents with opinion ‘+’, the probability of ending up after a discussion with j
agents having opinion ‘+’ is
pi,j =
∑
y∈ωi,j
Pi (y) , (7)
where Pi (y) is defined as in Proposition 1. It is clear that pi,j is the transition probability from state i
to state j, with i, j ∈ Fn.
From the transition probability measure pij , ∀i, j ∈ Fn, it is possible to define the transition matrix
Mn = (pi,j)i,j∈Fn , from which we have
Theorem 2. The stochastic process (Y t)t≥0 on Fn described by the pair (Mn, Fn) is an absorbing Markov
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chain such that states 0 and N are always absorbing. There exists one additional absorbing state s = (N/2)
if and only if the social space is composed exclusively of two odd-size tables of the same size.
See Appendix for the proof.
This is the main result of the paper as it provides the conditions for reaching consensus. In particular,
it states that the two states representing consensus either in opinion ‘-’ or ‘+’, i.e., 0 and N , are always
absorbing. Furthermore, excluding the very specific case of two odd tables of equal size, it is always possible
to reach consensus starting from a mixed opinion, that is, from states different from 0 and N . This result
confirms the findings of [12]. However, it is worth observing that, due to the random nature of the process,
the dynamics of convergence toward consensus is not necessarily monotonic as indicated in [12] and impasses,
i.e., states (s = (N/2)) where consensus is not reached, may emerge for specific configurations of the social
space. Such impasses were overlooked in previous contributions. We provide a simple example showing how
impasses can occur depending on the structure of the social space.
Example 3. Consider the case of 10 agents with two different social spaces: n1 = (3, 3, 4) and n2 = (5, 5).
Since at the end of each turn we have tables with homogeneous opinions, only states 0, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 10 are
feasible in social space n1 and 0, 5, 10 are feasible states in n2. It is clear that starting from states 0 and 1
the only possible evolution is to state 0 in both cases. As it concerns the other states, applying formula (3),
we can compute the transition probability matrices:
Mn1 =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13
15
0 0 2
15
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
72
120
0 0 44
120
4
120
0 0 0 0 0 0
54
210
0 0 122
210
25
210
0 9
210
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 48
84
14
84
0 14
84
8
84
0 0 0
0 0 0 36
210
9
210
0 79
210
86
210
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 40
120
44
120
0 0 36
120
0 0 0 0 0 0 2
15
2
15
0 0 11
15
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

;Mn2 =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5
6
0 0 0 0 1
6
0 0 0 0 0
10
21
0 0 0 0 11
21
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 11
21
0 0 0 0 10
21
0 0 0 0 0 1
6
0 0 0 0 5
6
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

.
In the first case, the dynamics is consistent to Galam’s model prediction, see, e.g. [12]. By contrast,
in the second case, as we have only two odd-size tables of the same size, the transition matrix has three
absorbing states as pointed out in Theorem 2. Therefore the dynamics described by the Markov process is
different from the one of [12].
Remark 4. In the transition matrices of the previous and the following examples the zero columns corre-
spond to states that are not feasible, i.e. (S/Fn). Nevertheless, as these states can be the initial condition of
the process, they are not omitted from our analysis.
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Obviously, even when considering a non-biased discussion function such as (5), absorbing states different
from consensus states (0 and N) are possible.
3. Stochastic killing point and quantitative illustration
Using the results of the previous section, we are able to analyze the diffusion of rumors. Indeed, given the
initial distribution vector pi0, the absorbing Markov chain (Mn, Fn) describes the dynamics of rumors under
majority rule in an N person-population with social space n. Once the absorbing states of the Markov chain
have been determined, it is possible to analyze the process in more detail. In fact, by simple algebra it is
possible to provide some important statistics, such as the expected time of convergence and the probability
to reach consensus on each of the two opinions. However, in order to perform this analysis and to understand
the rule of the social space in the convergence to consensus, it is first useful to define the equivalent of the so
called killing point for the Markov chain (Mn, Fn). In [12] the killing point is the point where the monotonic
flow –towards one of two stable fixed points– changes direction. The killing point is important to characterize
the rumor dynamics as it determines the border of the basin of attractions of the two stable fixed points 0
and 1.
To extend this notion to our formalization recall that now the fixed points 0 and 1 correspond to the
absorbing states 0 and N . Focusing on the case of two absorbing states only, i.e. excluding the cases of
social spaces made up of only two odd-sized tables of the same dimension, and denoting with pij(t) the t-step
transition probability, it is possible to define an analogue of the killing point for the absorbing Markov chain
proposed here. Let us call it stochastic killing point.
Definition 5. Excluding the cases for which the stochastic matrix Mn is characterized by more than two
absorbing states, we define the stochastic killing point of (Mn, Fn) as k
∗ = Y 0, such that limt→∞ pY 0,0(t) ≥
limt→∞ pY 0,N (t) and limt→∞ pY 0+1,0(t) < limt→∞ pY 0+1,N (t), with Y
0 ∈ S.
The value of k∗ can be easily calculated. Let us rewrite the transition matrix in the normal form:
M¯n =
 In 0
Rn Qn
 ,
where In is the identity matrix identifying the absorbing states related to the social space n, in our case
0 and N , Qn gives the transition probabilities between transient states and Rn transition probabilities to
absorbing states. We compute the fundamental matrix3 Zn = [I
′
n
−Qn]
−1
and Bn = ZnRn, where I
′
n
is the
identity matrix identifying the transient states related to n and Bn(i, j) indicates the probability to end up
3In this section, some classical results on absorbing Markov chains are used without explanation, for a general treatment see
[15].
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at the absorbing state j when starting from transient state i. Since we are considering transition matrices
with two absorbing states (0 and N), Bn has two columns. Let us introduce the following matrix
B¯n =

[1, 0]
Bn
[0, 1]
 ,
where entries b1,j (with j = 0, . . .N) give the probability that state j will be absorbed in state 0, while entries
b2,j give the probability that state j will be absorbed in state N , ∀j ∈ S. Under the majority rule dynamics,
b1,j is monotonically non-increasing with respect to j and b2,j is monotonically non-decreasing with respect
to j, therefore the stochastic killing point is k∗ = ĵ where ĵ is such that b1,ĵ > b2,ĵ and b1,ĵ+1 < b2,ĵ+1.
The stochastic killing point is important to understand the effects of different social spaces on the prob-
ability of reaching consensus either for opinion ‘-’ or ‘+’. We report some examples which illustrate this
aspect providing the average ρ = N/L and the variance σ2 =
∑
Tr∈N
(|Tr| − (N/L))
2 of the size of the tables
of the considered social spaces. In particular, let us consider a population of 10 agents as in Example 3 with
social space n1 and two additional ones, n3 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2) and n4 = (1, 1, 8). For each social space,
we compute the stochastic matrix Mn in normal form, vector (z0, . . . , zj, . . . , zN)
T
, where z0 = zN = 0
and (z1, . . . , zj, . . . , zN−1)
T
= Zn1 − 1, and matrix B¯n. These cases are represented in Figures 2, 3 and 4.
The left side of these figures represents the probabilities b1,j and b2,j to converge, starting from state j ∈ S,
respectively to absorbing states 0, and N . Probabilities for state 0, i.e., consensus on opinion ‘-’, are depicted
with black dots; those for state N , i.e., consensus on opinion ‘+’, are depicted with gray dots. The right side
of the figures represents the expected time, zj, of convergence to consensus (either 0 or N) for each initial
state j ∈ S. As we are considering discrete states the dashed lines are there for illustrative purpose only.
The caption of each figure also provides the average ρ and the variance σ of the size of the tables in the
social space.
In the following, we show how the average and the variance of the size of the tables in the social space
affect the diffusion of rumors.
In Figures 2 and 3 we consider two social spaces with the same N and similar in terms of σ2. As ρ
increases from ρ = 10/9 to ρ = 10/3 the stochastic killing point shifts to the left (compare Figures 2 a) and
3 a)), and the expected time required to reach consensus decreases, (compare Figures 2 b) and 3 b)).
The interpretation is straightforward: an initial minority supporting the rumor has less probability to
influence the majority (which does not support the rumor) and to change the common opinion about a fact
when the discussion takes place in large groups (large ρ). In other words, encouraging debate with many
people serves as a deterrent for the diffusion of rumors.
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Figure 2: Case n3 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2), ρ = 10/9, σ2 ≈ 0.8889 and k∗ = 9. Depending on the initial state j ∈ S: a)
probability to converge to the absorbing states 0 (black circles) and N (gray circles); b) expected time of convergence to
consensus (either 0 or N).
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Figure 3: Case n1 = (3, 3, 4), ρ = 10/3, σ2 ≈ 0.6667 and k∗ = 6. Depending on the initial state j ∈ S: a) probability to
converge to the absorbing states 0 (black circles) and N (gray circles); b) expected time of convergence to consensus (either 0
or N).
A similar effect is observed increasing σ2 and keeping ρ constant. Considering two social spaces with
the same N and ρ, increasing σ2, i.e., people gather either in very large groups or very small groups, the
stochastic killing point tends to shift to the left, compare Figures 3 a) (σ2 ≈ 0.6667) and 4 a) (σ2 ≈ 32.6667).
This means that the possibility that the rumor spreads across the population decreases and the expected
time of convergence to consensus reduces, compare Figures 3 b) and 4 b). These examples suggest that the
larger the average ρ and the variance σ2 of the size of the tables, the lower the probability for a rumor to
spread across the population. The reason for this is that when ρ and σ2 are large, interactions among agents
take place in few large tables and the effect of the majority rule, i.e. the assumed propensity of agents to
believe in rumors when at a table agents with opposing opinions match in number, has a lower weight. More
generally, when the tables are large, the weight of an agent in influencing others reduces and the opinion of
the majority prevails on the one of the minority more easily. The analysis we conducted suggests that, when
discussion takes place in large groups, the majority rule works well and prevents the diffusion of rumors.
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Figure 4: Case n4 = (1, 1, 8), ρ = 10/3, σ2 ≈ 32.6667 and k∗ = 5. Depending on the initial state j ∈ S: a) probability to
converge to the absorbing states 0 (black circles) and N (gray circles); b) expected time of convergence to consensus (either 0
or N).
4. Conditional expected value
In section 2 we proved that the stochastic process (Y t)t≥0 describing the dynamics of rumors under
majority rule dynamic is an absorbing Markov chain. In this section we show that, given the state of the
process at time t, it is possible to calculate the conditional expected value of the process at time t+1. Here
we provide a closed form solution for E
[
Y t+1|Y t = y
]
. To this purpose, let us define the set ωi,T+r ⊆ Ωi as
ωi,T+r =
{
y : y ∈ Ωy and yr ≥
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
+ 1
}
.
This is the event “given y agents with opinion ‘+’, at table Tr the majority of agents have opinion ‘+’ ”.
Moreover, let us provide the following results:
Lemma 6. Given the absorbing Markov chain (Mn, Fn) and the probability measure Py (y) ∀y ∈ S and
∀y ∈ Ωy, then
G
(
ωi,T+r
)
=
min(|Tr |,y)∑
yr=⌊ |Tr|2 ⌋+1
(
|Tr|
yr
)(
N−|Tr |
y−yr
)(
N
y
) (8)
is the probability of the event ωi,T+r .
Proof. According to Proposition 1, the probability of the event ωi,T+r is
G
(
ωi,T+r
)
=
∑
y∈ω
i,T
+
r
P (y) =
∑
y∈ω
i,T
+
r
(
y
y1,...,yL
)(
N−y
|T1|−y1,...,|TL|−yL
)(
N
|T1|,...,|TL|
) ,
which in an explicit form becomes:
G
(
ωi,T+r
)
=
min(|Tr|,y)∑
yr=⌊ |Tr|2 ⌋+1
 ∑
y1,...,yr−1,yr+1,...,yL:
y1+...+yr−1+yr+1+...+yL=y−yr
(
y
y1,...,yN
)(
N−y
|T1|−y1,...,|TL|−yL
)(
N
|TL|,...,|TL|
)
 .
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Multiplying and dividing by
(
N−nr
y−yr
)
and after some rearrangements, it is easy to obtain:
G
(
ωi,T+r
)
=
min(|Tr |,y)∑
yr=⌊ |Tr|2 ⌋+1
(
|Tr |
yr
)(
N−|Tr|
y−yr
)(
N
y
)
 ∑
y1,...,yr−1,yr+1,...,yL:
y1+...+yr−1+yr+1+...+yL=y−yr
(
|T1|
y1
)
· · ·
(
|Tr−1|
yr−1
)(
|Tr+1|
yr+1
)
· · ·
(
|TL|
yL
)(
N−|Tr|
y−yr
)
 ,
where the quantity inside the brackets is equal to 1 by Chu-Vandermonde’s identity. From which the claim
follows.
It is worth noting that G
(
ωi,T+r
)
= G
(
ωi,T+q
)
if Tr, Tq ∈ N and |Tr| = |Tq|. Using the results of the
previous lemma and given Y t = y, it is possible to derive the conditional expected value for the random
variable Y t+1.
Proposition 7. Given the absorbing Markov chain (Mn, Fn) and Y
t = y, the conditional expected value of
the random variable Y t+1 is
E
[
Y t+1|Y t = y
]
= N
K∑
k=1
ak
min(k,y)∑
j=⌊ k2 ⌋+1
(
k
j
)(
N−k
y−j
)(
N
y
) , (9)
where K is the number of seats of the larger table of the social space N .
Proof. The conditional expected value of Y t+1 can be easily written as
E
[
Y t+1|Y t = y
]
=
∑
Tr∈N
|Tr|G
(
ωi,T+r
)
.
Collecting the same size tables by (1) and let G
(
ωi,T+r
)
= G
(
ωi,k+
)
if |Tr| = k, we have
E
[
Y t+1|Y t = y
]
=
K∑
k=1
kτkG
(
ωi,k+
)
,
which can be rewritten as follows
E
[
Y t+1|Y t = y
]
= N
K∑
k=1
k
N
τkG
(
ωi,k+
)
and by (2) and Lemma 6 the thesis follows.
The closed form solution of the conditional expected value of the stochastic process is particularly useful
for calibrations and can be used as an alternative to Galam’s formula when the social space is large and the
calculations to obtain the transition matrix are cumbersome.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an exhaustive formulation for rumors spreading described in [12]. Specifically,
the paper shows that the diffusion of rumors follows an absorbing Markov chain which partially confirms the
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results provided in [12].
The mathematical formulation of the model we propose is particularly suitable for studying the diffusion
of opinions in small communities. When the number of people in the communities is relatively small the
calculations required to obtain the transition matrix are still tractable and a complete description of the
phenomena can be provided. For bigger groups of people, the transition matrix requires a cumbersome
calculation to be defined and the conditional expected values derived in Proposition 7 can be used as an
alternative to the Galam’s formula to obtain a prediction for the dynamics of the phenomena.
Our approach extends Galam’s analysis providing further results and precision. Using a Markov chain
helps to have further information about the process of diffusion of opinions which are not possible to ob-
tain using the original Galam’s formulation. In particular, it is possible to compute the expected time of
absorption for each transient state and the probability to reach a specific absorbing state starting from a
transient state. Finally, using the more precise formalization that we provide, it is possible to prove the
existence of impasses, i.e., absorbing states different from 0 and N , which were impossible to detect with
the original formalization. Moreover, the approach we propose is also useful for other reasons. First of all, it
provides some consistency to existing literature on opinion dynamics, such as the DeGroot type models, as
we illustrate that even Galam’s model can be formalized as Markov chains. Secondly, formulating Galam’s
model as a Markov process provides a starting point to compare Galam’s and DeGroot’s models and to
understand their differences. In particular, contributions such as [10] are steps in this direction, as their
approach provides a flexible tool to model people inclinations towards two binary choices “yes” or “no”
and to transform a discrete opinion model in a continuum of opinions. The framework provided in [10] is
so general that it can even be used to model an inclination of agents towards the opinion of the minority.
However, the gap between the two approaches is still not completely closed as the subgroup structure of the
Galam’s model is an essential feature to explain the phenomenon of minority opinion spreading that is not
considered in [10].
With further research it will be possible to extend the analysis in several directions. First of all, starting
from the formalization we provide, it would be interesting to analyze the role that the social space has
on the final outcome4, then some of the assumptions can be relaxed in order to make the model more
realistic, for example modeling individual influence and introducing a more complex-network structure for
connecting individuals as in [1]. In addition, it would be interesting to assume that the process by which
individuals reach consensus within the group is similar to the one considered in [9]. Moving further on in this
direction, another line of research is modeling interactions other than discussions. For example, in [5], the
4We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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interactions among agents may consist of binary choices (see, for instance, Schelling’s seminal contribution
[19]) as formalized in [4]. Yet, binary choices are just one possibility among the others, as several other
interactions can be considered, see for example [8] and references therein. Finally, it will be interesting
to analyze the dinamics when some individuals dismiss opposite opinions no matter how valid as this will
prevent full polarization and would be more realistic.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2. By Proposition 1 and the transition probability formula, it is clear that (Mn, Fn)
is a Markov chain and states 0 and N are always absorbing, i.e. p0,0 = 1 and pN,N = 1. In the following, we
will prove that there is at most another absorbing state and all the other states are transient.
As we have mentioned above, the same state v may be the result of reaching the majority at different
combinations of tables. Let us denote Cv the set of all the table combinations giving state v.
In order to investigate the existence of other possible absorbing states different from 0 and N , let us
consider an arbitrary feasible state v (∈ Fn) such that v 6= 0 and v 6= N . Consider an arbitrary Cv ∈ Cv and
other two states u and w, such that:
u =
∑
Tr∈Cv
|Tr| − |Tq| <
∑
Tr∈Cv
|Tr| = v <
∑
Tr∈Cv
|Tr|+ |Tz| = w,
where Tq is the minimal size table in Cv, and Tz is the minimal size table in (N/Cv). It is clear that
u,w ∈ Fn, i.e., they are feasible states.
These table combinations are illustrated in Figure .5; the gray regions respectively represent N/Cu,
N/Cv and N/Cw.
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Tz
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Tz
Figure .5: Table combinations for states u < v < w: a) Cu, b) Cv, and c) Cw.
If v is an absorbing state then it must be pv,u = pv,w = 0; we will show that this cannot hold and
therefore v cannot be an absorbing state5.
Let us consider pv,u = 0, this means that from state v it is impossible to reach state u, that is, for all the
table combinations Cu ∈ Cu, relative to state u, it is impossible that the majority of opinion ‘+’ is reached
only at the tables in Cu. This means that even if all the seats at tables in Cu are taken by the v agents
with opinion ‘+’, the remaining v − u agents with opinion ‘+’ cannot be seated at tables in N/Cu, without
reaching the majority on at least one of these tables6. Formally
v − u ≥ 1 +
∑
Tr∈(N/Cu)
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
, (.1)
where
∑
Tr∈(N/Cu)
⌊
|Tr |
2
⌋
is the maximum number of agents that can be seated at tables in N/Cu without
reaching the majority of opinion ‘+’. As |Tq| = v − u, Equation (.1) can be rewritten as
|Tq| ≥ 1 +
∑
Tr∈(N/Cu)
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
. (.2)
From Figure .5 a) and b), we can see that, table combinations giving states v and u differ by table Tq
only. Therefore, it follows that N/Cu = {Tq}∪N/Cv and that, in order not to reach the majority of opinion
‘+’ at tables in N/Cu, such a majority must not be reached neither at table Tq nor at tables in N/Cv, that
is
∑
Tr∈(N/Cu)
⌊
|Tr |
2
⌋
=
⌊
|Tq|
2
⌋
+
∑
Tr∈(N/Cv)
⌊
|Tr |
2
⌋
. As a consequence Equation (.2) can be rewritten as:
|Tq| ≥ 1 +
⌊
|Tq|
2
⌋
+
∑
Tr∈(N/Cv)
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
. (.3)
Let us consider the table combinations giving states u < v < w; we already know
∑
Tr∈(N/Cu)
⌊
|Tr |
2
⌋
=
5Therefore, to prove that v is not an absorbing state, it will be sufficient to see that, for an arbitrary Cv ∈ Cv, holds either
pv,u 6= 0 or pv,w 6= 0.
6Obviously, this condition must hold ∀Cu ∈ Cu.
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⌊
|Tq |
2
⌋
+
∑
Tr∈(N/Cv)
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
. Furthermore,
⌊
|Tz|
2
⌋
+
∑
Tr∈(N/Cw)
⌊
|Tr |
2
⌋
=
∑
Tr∈(N/Cv)
⌊
|Tr |
2
⌋
as Tz ∈ (N/Cv);
therefore, (.3) can be rewritten as
|Tq| ≥ 1 +
⌊
|Tq|
2
⌋
+
⌊
|Tz|
2
⌋
+
∑
Tr∈(N/Cw)
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
. (.4)
We can observe that if |Tq| < |Tz|, (.4) does not hold. Now let us examine the two remaining cases
|Tq| > |Tz| and |Tq| = |Tz| separately.
1. |Tq| > |Tz|. Consider the feasible state u′ = u + |Tz| < v; taking into account the table combinations
we have
u′ =
∑
Tr∈Cu
|Tr|+ |Tz| =
∑
Tr∈Cv
|Tr| − |Tq|+ |Tz| <
∑
Tr∈Cv
|Tr| = v,
as |Tq| > |Tz|. Obviously if v is an absorbing state, then it must also be pv,u′ = 0.
If pv,u′ = 0 then, for all Cu′ ∈ Cu′ , after u′ agents are seated at the tables in Cu′ , the majority is
reached on at least one of the tables in N/Cu′ , and therefore
v − u′ = |Tq| − |Tz| ≥ 1 +
∑
Tr∈(N/Cu′)
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
,
which can be rewritten as:
|Tq| − |Tz| ≥ 1 +
∑
Tr∈(N/Cu′ )
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
= 1 +
⌊
|Tq|
2
⌋
−
⌊
|Tz|
2
⌋
+
∑
Tr∈(N/Cv)
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
. (.5)
Since Tz ∈ (N/Cv), it holds
∑
Tr∈(N/Cv)
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
>
⌊
|Tz|
2
⌋
, and we have:
|Tq| − |Tz| ≥ 1 +
⌊
|Tq|
2
⌋
−
⌊
|Tz|
2
⌋
+
∑
Tr∈(N/Cv)
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
≥ 1 +
⌊
|Tq|
2
⌋
. (.6)
Now consider state w; as v is assumed to be an absorbing state, it must be pv,w = 0 as well.
If pv,w = 0 then, for all Cw ∈ Cw, v is smaller than the minimal number of agents with opinion ‘+’ to
have the majority at each of the tables in Cw = Cv ∪ {Tz}. Formally:
v =
∑
Tr∈Cv
|Tr| <
∑
Tr∈Cw
(⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
+ 1
)
=
(⌊
|Tz|
2
⌋
+ 1
)
+
∑
Tr∈Cv
(⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
+ 1
)
. (.7)
Rearranging some terms, condition (.7) can be rewritten as
∑
Tr∈Cv
|Tr| −
∑
Tr∈Cv
(⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
+ 1
)
<
(⌊
|Tz|
2
⌋
+ 1
)
, (.8)
which is equivalent to ∑
Tr∈Cv
(
|Tr| −
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
− 1
)
<
⌊
|Tz|
2
⌋
+ 1. (.9)
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Since Tq ∈ Cv, the condition (.9) can be rewritten as
|Tq| −
⌊
|Tq|
2
⌋
− 1 +
∑
Tr∈Cu
(
|Tr| −
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
− 1
)
<
⌊
|Tz|
2
⌋
+ 1. (.10)
From pv,u′ = 0 and pv,w = 0 respectively follow conditions (.6) and (.10); now we show that from these
latter conditions a contradiction follows. In fact, condition (.6) can be rewritten as − |Tq| + |Tz| ≤
−
⌊
|Tq |
2
⌋
− 1, which plugged in (.10) gives:
|Tq| − |Tq|+ |Tz|+
∑
Tr∈Cu
(
|Tr| −
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
− 1
)
<
⌊
|Tz|
2
⌋
+ 1, (.11)
which can be simplified to
|Tz|+
∑
Tr∈Cu
(
|Tr| −
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
− 1
)
<
⌊
|Tz|
2
⌋
+ 1. (.12)
Since
∑
Tr∈(Cv/{Tq})
(
|Tr| −
⌊
|Tr |
2
⌋
− 1
)
≥ 0 and |Tz| ≥
⌊
|Tz |
2
⌋
+1, it follows that (.12) is never satisfied.
Therefore, conditions (.6) and (.10) cannot both hold at the same time and then, in this case, v cannot
be an absorbing state.
2. |Tq| = |Tz|. When |Tq| and |Tz| are even, condition (.4) cannot hold. On the other hand, when |Tq|
and |Tz| are odd, from condition (.4) it follows that
∑
Tr∈(N/Cw)
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
= 0. (.13)
Furthermore, rearranging terms in condition (.10) we obtain
|Tq| −
⌊
|Tq|
2
⌋
−
⌊
|Tz|
2
⌋
− 1 +
∑
Tr∈Cu
(
|Tr| −
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
− 1
)
< 1. (.14)
As, in this case, Tq and Tz are two same odd size tables, it holds |Tq| =
⌊
|Tq|
2
⌋
+
⌊
|Tq|
2
⌋
+ 1 =⌊
|Tq|
2
⌋
+
⌊
|Tz|
2
⌋
+ 1, and therefore (.14) becomes
∑
Tr∈Cu
(
|Tr| −
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
− 1
)
< 1. (.15)
As
∑
Tr∈Cu
(
|Tr| −
⌊
|Tr |
2
⌋
− 1
)
≥ 0, from condition (.15) it follows:
∑
Tr∈Cu
(
|Tr| −
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
− 1
)
= 0. (.16)
This condition holds if and only if all tables in Cu have size not larger than 2.
Let us discuss (.13) and (.16) first when both Cv and N/Cv are nonempty sets and then when both
Cv and N/Cv are empty sets:
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(a) In the first case we can distinguish between two situations (remember that by assumption Tq and
Tz are the smaller size tables in Cv and (N/Cv) respectively):
i. Let us consider the case |Tq| = |Tz| = 1; as we rule out the trivial case discussed in Footnote
1, there exists at least a table Tg ∈ N such that |Tg| ≥ 2. If Tg ∈ N/Cv, then Tg ∈ N/Cw as
|Tz| = 1; therefore, condition (.13) cannot hold. On the other hand, if Tg ∈ Cv, then Tg ∈ Cu
as |Tq| = 1. Since condition (.16) holds if and only if all the tables in Cu have a size not larger
than 2, it must be |Tg| = 2. We show that even in such a case v cannot be an absorbing state.
Indeed, consider table combination C′u = (Cu ∪ {Tq} ∪ {Tz}) / {Tg}; as |Tg| = |Tz| + |Tq| it
follows that C′u ∈ Cu. We showed that, if pvu = 0, then for all Cu ∈ Cu condition (.2) holds.
In particular, considering C′u ∈ Cu we have
|Tq| = v − u ≥ 1 +
∑
Tr∈(N/C′u)
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
. (.17)
As Tg /∈ C′u it follows that Tg ∈ N/C
′
u and
|Tq| = 1 ≥ 1 +
∑
Tr∈(N/C′u)
⌊
|Tr|
2
⌋
> 2. (.18)
Therefore, it follows that, when |Tq| = |Tz| = 1 and Cv and N/Cv are two nonempty sets, v
cannot be an absorbing state.
ii. Let us consider the cases |Tq| = |Tz| ≥ 3. As pvu = 0 implies (.13), if N/Cw 6= ∅ then state
v is not absorbing, since condition (.13) does not hold. Similarly, as pvw = 0 implies (.16), if
Cu 6= ∅ then, again, state v is not absorbing since (.16) does not hold.
(b) Finally, let us consider the interesting case in which Cu and N/Cw are two empty sets. It is
clear that conditions (.13) and (.16) are trivially satisfied. Moreover, N = {Tq, Tz} and u = 0,
v = |Tq| = |Tz| and w = |Tq| + |Tz| = N are the only feasible states. This implies that pv,u = 0
and pv,w = 0 become sufficient conditions to prove that v is an absorbing state. Since the two
conditions are satisfied, we can conclude that the Markov chain (Mn, Fn) has a third absorbing
state when N = {Tq, Tz} with Tq and Tz two odd size tables and two absorbing states 0 and N
in all the other cases.
We showed that (Mn, Fn) has an inner minimal closed set when the social space consists of two same
odd-sized tables. In this case the inner minimal closed set is an absorbing state, and all the other feasible
states, i.e. 0 and N , are also absorbing states; here the minimal closed sets consist of one single state.
In all the other cases, we have proved that no inner absorbing states can exist. It is possible to prove
that minimal closed sets which are not absorbing states cannot exist either. In fact, their presence would
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require both conditions to have an inner absorbing state as those discussed above and more stringent ones.
As it is well known, in Markov chains all states not belonging to minimal closed sets are transient, see, e.g.
[2], and we can conclude that (Mn, Fn) is an absorbing Markov chain.
References
[1] D. Acemog˘lu, G. Como, F. Fagnani, and A. Ozdaglar. Opinion fluctuations and disagreement in social
networks. Mathematics of Operations Research, 38(1):1–27, 2013.
[2] E. Behrends. Introduction to Markov chains: with special emphasis on rapid mixing. Free University of
Berlin, Vieweg Verlag, Advanced Lecture Notes in Mathematics edition, 2000.
[3] L. R. Berger. A necessary and sufficient condition for reaching a consensus using DeGroot’s method.
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 76(374):415–418, 1981.
[4] G. I. Bischi and U. Merlone. Global dynamics in binary choice models with social influence. The Journal
of Mathematical Sociology, 33(4):277–302, 2009.
[5] G. I. Bischi and U. Merlone. Binary choices in small and large groups: A unified model. Physica A:
Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 389(4):843–853, 2010.
[6] G. I. Bischi and U. Merlone. Global dynamics in adaptive models of collective choice with social
influence. In G. Naldi, L. Pareschi, and G. Toscani, editors, Mathematical Modeling of Collective
Behavior in Socio-Economic and Life Sciences, pages 223–244. Birkhauser, New York, NY, 2010.
[7] B. Buechel, T. Hellmann, and S. Klo¨ßner. Opinion dynamics under conformity. Working Paper, Institute
of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, 2013.
[8] B. Buechel, T. Hellmann, and M. Pichler. The dynamics of continuous cultural traits in social networks.
Working Paper, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, 2012.
[9] M. H. DeGroot. Reaching a consensus. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 69(345):118–121,
1974.
[10] M. Fo¨rster, M. Grabisch, and A. Rusinowska. Anonymous social influence. Games and Economic
Behavior, 82:621–635, 2013.
[11] S. Galam. Social paradoxes of majority rule voting and renormalization group. Journal of Statistical
Physics, 61(3-4):943–951, 1990.
18
[12] S. Galam. Modelling rumors: the no plane Pentagon French hoax case. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics
and Its Applications, 320:571–580, 2003.
[13] S. Galam. Sociophysics, A Physicist’s Modeling of Psycho-political Phenomena. Understanding Complex
Systems. Springer, 2012.
[14] S. Galam, Y. Gefen, and Y. Shapir. Sociophysics: A new approach of sociological collective behaviour.
1. Mean-behaviour description of a strike. The Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 9(1):1–13, 1982.
[15] O. C. Ibe. Markov processes for stochastic modeling. Elsevier Academic Press, London, UK, 2009.
[16] J. Lorenz. A stabilization theorem for dynamics of continuous opinions. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics
and its Applications, 335(1):217–223, 2005.
[17] S. Moscovici, E. Lage, and M. Naffrechoux. Influence of a consistent minority on the responses of a
majority in a color perception task. Sociometry, 32(4):365–380, Dec. 1969.
[18] P. Nyczka and K. Sznajd-Weron. Anticonformity or independence?–Insights from statistical physics.
Journal of Statistical Physics, 151(1–2):174–202, 2013.
[19] T. C. Schelling. Hockey helmets, concealed weapons, and daylight saving: A study of binary choices
with externalities. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 17(3):381–428, 1973.
[20] D. Stauffer. A biased review of sociophysics. Journal of Statistical Physics, 151(1-2):9–20, 2012.
19
